SC to ‘consider’ plea to revive NJAC: CJI

CJI Signals Fresh Consideration of NJAC: Revisiting Judicial Appointments Amidst Institutional Stalemate

On November 27, 2025, the Chief Justice of India announced that the Supreme Court would ‘consider’ a petition seeking the revival of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). This marks a potential shake-up of India's heavily contested judicial appointments process, which has remained under the opaque Collegium system since NJAC's striking down in 2015. The NJAC, crafted through the 99th Constitutional Amendment, was discarded as unconstitutional—a verdict seen as safeguarding judicial independence but critiqued for institutionalizing judicial exclusivity.

Does This Break the Deadlock or Revisit the Same Gridlock?

This announcement is unexpected, given the Supreme Court’s staunch defense of the Collegium system for eight years. The "Fourth Judges Case" (2015)—which invalidated NJAC—invoked the “basic structure doctrine” to assert that independence of the judiciary is inviolable. The ruling meant that no Executive or Legislative role could penetrate judicial appointments without risking politicization. Yet, institutional critiques of the Collegium are anything but novel—they are increasingly loud and diverse. Allegations of nepotism, lack of transparency, and slow appointment processes have dogged the mechanism despite its constitutional sanctity.

The CJI’s readiness to ‘consider’ NJAC indicates a potential willingness to revisit earlier positions. This stance deviates from the Supreme Court’s previous rigidity on judicial primacy in appointments. Importantly, the petition doesn’t simply seek an NJAC reboot but urges structural adjustments to safeguard judicial autonomy while addressing systemic inefficiencies—a key detail that could shift the power dynamics of this debate.

The Constitutional Machinery and Screaming Silences

Architecturally, the NJAC hinged on Articles 124A, 124B, and 124C, introduced by the 99th Amendment. Article 124A dictated a six-member body chaired by the Chief Justice of India; Article 124B assigned it power over judicial appointments and transfers; Article 124C empowered parliamentary legislation to regulate NJAC. Yet, the 2015 ruling struck down not just these Articles but the very principles underpinning the NJAC Act.

The Collegium system, on its part, evolved through judicial interpretation, not constitutional text. Articles 124(2) and 217(1) mention appointment "after consultation" with the CJI—interpreted by the Supreme Court in three seminal Judges Cases. The Collegium now involves a five-member body in Supreme Court judge appointments and a three-member High Court Collegium initiating recommendations. However, neither process is codified through statute, leaving appointments at the mercy of opaque internal practices.

Meanwhile, criticisms of NJAC’s composition remain valid. The inclusion of the Law Minister and two "eminent persons" introduces executive and non-judicial influence, raising risks of quid pro quo appointments and political interference. Yet the opposite problem persists—judges selecting judges without oversight produces unchecked power and delays. Judicial independence cannot mean judicial isolation.

The Data Points Reveal Contradictions

• Between 2018 and 2024, more than 300 judicial vacancies in High Courts remained pending for over 12 months, despite Collegium recommendations being sent to the Executive. Statutory timelines are nearly absent.
• Judicial appointments take an average of 259 days for processing, as per data collated by PRS Legislative Research. The Collegium lacks institutional mechanisms to expedite decisions.
• The judiciary’s pendency burden stands at over 69,000 Supreme Court cases, 59 lakh High Court cases, and 4 crore cases in subordinate courts as of 2025. Delays in appointments contribute to this backlog.

What these numbers obscure is the systemic blame game: the Government argues that Collegium recommendations come late or incomplete; the judiciary counters with accusations of deliberate clearance delays. The NJAC, with formalized timelines, could theoretically improve speed—but only if both arms of governance cooperate.

Uncomfortable Questions the Petition Fails to Ask

Restoring NJAC or modifying the Collegium is not inherently a cure-all. None of the proposals address underlying structural inefficiencies. For instance, High Court Collegiums face state-level political interference during consultations—a problem neither NJAC nor the Collegium system seem capable or willing to tackle. The proposed NJAC composition, which includes "eminent persons," raises legitimacy questions about who qualifies as such. In the absence of clear criteria, political nominations risk further diluting the merit-based ethos.

The broader question is also of timing. Why now? The current political climate is charged with increasing allegations of centralization. Reviving NJAC—or even entertaining the plea—invites doubts about judicial pretexts. Could this signal the judiciary compromising its independence not under pressure, but in pursuit of expedience?

Learning from the UK's Judicial Appointments Commission

One comparative case offers a sharp contrast—the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) of the United Kingdom. Unlike NJAC, the JAC operates independently of both Executive and Judiciary but ensures diverse participation from non-judicial domains. It follows formal timelines, publishes selection criteria, and submits names after bipartisan consultations. The UK model tackles political interference by limiting the Executive’s role to procedural approvals while ensuring transparent, skills-based appointments.

India's collegium system, by contrast, operates on inter-personal consensus rather than structured rules, while NJAC gives explicit veto power to politically-affiliated actors. Both extremes highlight how institutional design shapes outcomes—it remains to be seen whether India learns selectively from the UK experience.

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