A Flawed Year? UNSC Veto Usage Surges Amidst Calls for Reform
Between January 2025 and November 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) witnessed an unprecedented 23 instances of veto power usage by its permanent members—almost double the average of previous years. From stalled resolutions on the Ukraine war to blocked interventions in the Israel–Hamas conflict, the surge has renewed questions about the outdated structure of the global body. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, speaking at the International Conference of Chief Justices in Lucknow, sharply underscored the pressing need for reform—both of the UN itself and the skewed international order it represents.
Why This Debate Signals a Departure
The call for restructuring is not new. Yet, Singh's framing differs in linking structural stagnation at the UN to real-world inaction across crises ranging from Syria to Myanmar. His emphasis didn’t merely repeat grievances; it pointed to broader geopolitical shifts. The G20 Presidency under India and the revival of the Global South’s collective demands—articulated during the 2023 Global South Summit—signal growing discontent with multilateral institutions that many argue are stacked against developing nations.
Consider Latin America and Africa, regions entirely absent among the five permanent members—the so-called P5 (US, UK, Russia, China, and France). According to UN data, these regions house over 34% of the world's population but wield less than 5% of the decision-making clout in Security Council deliberations. The absurdity is clear: countries like Nigeria and Brazil are major regional powers, but their voices are muted in the mechanisms that determine global peace.
The Machinery Behind UN Reform
Decisions on reforming the UNSC stem from Article 108 of the UN Charter, which requires two-thirds of the General Assembly membership and full agreement among all P5 members for changes to take effect. This framework itself is the bottleneck. Any proposed expansion—such as the G4 nations’ (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) push for broader permanent representation—has routinely faced resistance from current veto-holders, particularly China.
India has long called for limiting veto misuse, citing the UNSC’s inertia during critical humanitarian crises, such as its inability to decisively act during the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar. Through platforms like BRICS+ and IBSA, India has pushed for “reformed multilateralism”—a model that promises equitable representation but remains speculative given persistent global North-South friction. Critics warn that simply expanding permanent membership without addressing veto powers or improving speed of decision-making could merely replicate existing gridlocks on a larger scale.
Patterns in Data: Reclaiming Credibility?
India’s Defence Minister was blunt in highlighting institutional decay beyond the UNSC. He cited the sluggish pace of the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic’s early months, when vaccine delays disproportionately affected low-income nations. For instance, WHO’s slow Covax rollout left less than 1% of Africans vaccinated by March 2021—a number dwarfed by the nearly 40% vaccination rate in richer G7 countries by the same time frame.
Similarly, International Monetary Fund (IMF) data reveals that emergency pandemic-related assistance to low-income nations totalled $115 billion between 2020 and 2022, a figure dwarfed by the estimated $1.8 trillion GDP losses faced by these nations during the period. These gaps fuel mistrust and reinforce the view that multilateral systems are skewed in favour of wealthier nations whose priorities often overshadow developmental objectives.
The problem is not purely financial, though. According to UNDP (United Nations Development Program) statistics, climate-induced displacement will likely exceed 200 million by 2050. Yet, funding for the Green Climate Fund currently remains at a modest $11.7 billion—short of the $100 billion annual pledge agreed upon in the Paris Treaty. Such figures highlight deep disconnects between global promises and tangible outcomes.
Uncomfortable Questions No One Is Asking
What Rajnath Singh’s speech didn’t address were the structural constraints to reform itself. While India advocates for G4 inclusion in the UNSC, even optimistic estimates suggest a minimum 15-year timeline to achieve the necessary legal changes given entrenched P5 resistance—particularly China’s objections to Japan’s inclusion. Meanwhile, critics argue that there is no evidence that adding countries to the Security Council fixes its core issues like slow decision-making or bias.
The timing of calls for reform also raises questions. For instance, India’s push for Global South inclusion through forums like the 2023 Global South Summit may be strategically linked to its ambitions to become a permanent UNSC member rather than a disinterested push for equitable reform. Is the pursuit of multilateralism itself vulnerable to geopolitical jockeying?
And then there’s the issue of regional organizations. Strengthening platforms like ASEAN, QUAD, and AU (African Union) could be quicker, more practical alternatives to unwieldy, trust-deficient global institutions—but such initiatives often lack the political gravitas and funding to rival UN mechanisms. The irony is that the default reliance on outdated multilateral structures only perpetuates fragility.
Lessons from South Korea’s Strategy
The call for reform isn't uniquely Indian. In 2018, South Korea proposed creating a “Global 20” interim council for handling emergency issues like cyberattacks and AI ethics governance. Unlike the rigid structure of the UNSC, South Korea's model suggested non-permanent rotating membership based on GDP, population, and contributions to global public goods. While the idea gained traction briefly due to its inclusivity, it floundered because dominant states resisted this decentralization.
This contrasts starkly with India’s G4 approach, which focuses more on permanent representation privileges rather than flexible governance models. Both approaches underscore the same tension: balancing power redistribution with practical functionality.
Practice Questions for UPSC
Prelims Practice Questions
- Statement 1: The UNSC operates under Article 108 of the UN Charter for reforms.
- Statement 2: The P5 members must agree unanimously for any reform to take effect.
- Statement 3: The G4 nations include Brazil, Germany, India, and South Korea.
Which of the above statements is/are correct?
- Statement 1: The structure of the UN is outdated and affects its response to global crises.
- Statement 2: Countries like Nigeria and Brazil hold influential positions in the UNSC.
- Statement 3: There is a consensus among P5 members on reforming the veto power.
Which of the above statements is/are correct?
Frequently Asked Questions
What recent trends have been observed in the usage of veto power by the UNSC permanent members?
There has been a notable surge in the usage of veto power by the permanent members of the UNSC, with 23 instances recorded between January and November 2025. This is almost double the average from previous years and has raised concerns regarding the efficacy and modern relevance of the UN's structure.
How does the current structure of the UNSC impact representation for developing nations?
The current UNSC structure heavily favors a few countries (the P5 members), with developing regions such as Latin America and Africa, despite housing over 34% of the global population, having significantly less representation and decision-making power. This imbalance has led to calls for reform to enhance equitable representation for these nations.
What mechanisms exist for reforming the UN Security Council according to the article?
Reform proposals within the UNSC are governed by Article 108 of the UN Charter, which requires a two-thirds majority from the General Assembly along with unanimous consent from all P5 members. This complex requirement is often viewed as a significant barrier to substantive reform efforts.
What are some criticisms of merely expanding the UNSC's permanent membership?
Critics argue that adding more permanent members without addressing the existing power dynamics, such as veto authority, will only replicate current issues like decision-making gridlock. It suggests that mere expansion could result in a larger group facing the same challenges, rather than improving efficiency or equity.
In what ways did the COVID-19 pandemic highlight shortcomings in international organizations like the WHO?
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed significant delays in vaccine distribution orchestrated by organizations such as WHO, disproportionately impacting low-income countries. Statistics indicated that less than 1% of Africans were vaccinated by early March 2021, while wealthier nations had a vaccination rate nearing 40%, illustrating the failure of multilateral systems to prioritize equitable access.
Source: LearnPro Editorial | International Relations | Published: 22 November 2025 | Last updated: 3 March 2026
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