Strengthening Global Biosecurity and Modernising the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Why Bioterrorism Isn't Just a Future Threat: India's Push Towards Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention

On December 2, 2025, India’s External Affairs Minister, addressing the 50th anniversary conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), issued a stark warning: the world is "not yet adequately prepared" for the rising specter of bioterrorism. The statement, made in Geneva, underscored the growing mismatch between technological advances in genome editing and synthetic biology and the institutional inertia afflicting global biosecurity frameworks.

To frame the problem in numbers: the BWC operates without a verification mechanism, relies on sporadic Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), and supports its modest Implementation Support Unit (ISU) with a budget of less than $1.5 million annually. This, for an international treaty tasked with monitoring bio-threats in a world where the synthetic biology market alone is projected to surpass $50 billion by 2030. The scale of under-investment is glaring.

What the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Currently Offers

Founded in 1975 as the first treaty to outlaw an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, the BWC laid admirable groundwork. It prohibits states from developing, acquiring, stockpiling, or using biological and toxin weapons. Administered by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its membership extends to 189 countries, including India.

The treaty's implementation rests on three pillars:

• These require member states to report biosecurity-related research and facilities annually. Compliance, however, remains poor—less than 60% of states submit these reports regularly.
• Established in 2007, the ISU is chronically underfunded, with negotiations for permanent expansion mired in geopolitical stalemates.
• Held every five years, these assess implementation and emerging risks but often end inconclusively, particularly on the contentious issue of verification protocols.

Despite these mechanisms, yawning gaps persist: no compliance monitoring, no dedicated scientific advisory arms, and no frameworks to address dual-use biotechnology, where research for peaceful purposes can be misappropriated for malicious intent.

India's Call to Modernise Global Biosecurity: A Case For

India’s proposals for reform are not merely rhetorical; they reflect pragmatic recognition of biosecurity risks compounded by technological shifts. With advancements in CRISPR gene-editing technology and AI-driven bioengineering, pathogens today can be weaponised with unprecedented precision. The rise of synthetic biology makes the creation of variants of anthrax or botulinum toxin a feasible enterprise outside heavily regulated labs.

Domestically, India’s preparedness, though far from flawless, demonstrates foresight. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), under the 2008 Biological Disaster Management Guidelines, has developed multi-agency mechanisms for response coordination. India's Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP) and the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) further bolster biosurveillance capacities. Crucially, India has advocated creating a National Implementation Framework to consolidate domestic measures with global biosecurity protocols.

India’s case for modernising the BWC hinges on three key demands:

• A permanent Scientific Advisory Board to monitor biotechnological advancements.
• A formal verification protocol consistent with international biosecurity standards.
• Enhanced transparency measures for reporting facilities and dual-use research.

These recommendations directly address institutional weaknesses, especially the BWC's inability to track compliance among countries with advanced bio-research capacities—China and the US being key examples.

The Case Against: Structural Obstacles and Geopolitical Realities

While India's proposals are sound, critics rightly argue that they are politically unfeasible without resolving persistent geopolitical friction. The BWC’s verification deadlock dates back to 2001 when US opposition—rooted in concerns about revealing military and industrial secrets—torpedoed negotiations. Decades later, entrenched tensions between major powers like the US, China, and Russia render substantive consensus improbable.

The irony here is that while lesser-developed states push for equitable biosecurity governance, wealthier countries resist greater scrutiny. India's call for peer-review transparency risks replicating this stalemate. Similarly, efforts to fund the ISU adequately have floundered because political actors—despite their rhetoric—lack urgency. A $1.5 million budget for global biosecurity pales against the billions governments spend annually on biodefense research.

Beyond geopolitics, the convention struggles to address ambiguities in defining dual-use technologies. Innovations in synthetic biology are challenging to police because separating peaceful applications from potential misuse often requires subjective assessments. Without a robust scientific advisory arm, enforcement risks becoming arbitrary.

Lessons from International Precedents: The Case of Australia

Australia offers one notable example of a nation prioritising biosecurity as part of national defense. Its National Biosecurity Strategy (2023) integrates cutting-edge surveillance technologies, strict controls over dual-use research, and educational networks aimed at preventing misuse in academic labs. Unlike the BWC, Australia pairs its investments with detailed reporting mandates for research institutions.

Yet even Australia’s biosecurity apparatus has limits—it focuses on domestic preparedness without addressing global compliance gaps. The lesson: no single country can fortify biosecurity independently. A multilateral treaty like the BWC remains indispensable, not replaceable.

Where Things Stand: Navigating the Risks

The risk of bioterrorism is no longer theoretical; COVID-19’s global disruption proved the catastrophic potential of outbreaks, natural or deliberate. While India's arguments for reforming the BWC are essential, its success depends on overcoming two challenges: persuading powerful states to cede ground on transparency and funding, and restoring trust through equitable, science-driven protocols.

In short, the structural limitations of the BWC are as much geopolitical as procedural. Until major powers shift their stance, progress will remain incremental. India’s proactive approach, however, can yet anchor reform efforts within the UN framework.

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