Need of Underwater Domain Awareness Amid Red Sea Cable Disruption

The ₹4,077 Crore Question: Red Sea Disruptions and India's Underwater Blind Spot

On September 9, 2025, fresh disruptions to submarine communication cables in the Red Sea reached headlines, sparking global concerns about the security and resilience of undersea infrastructure. These cables, carrying over 95% of the world's international data and financial transactions, represent critical arteries of connectivity. For India, the incident was a wake-up call—not just for identifying vulnerabilities in its own subsea network but for questioning why Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) continues to languish as a neglected pillar of national security.

India's Cable Vulnerability: Why This Breaks the Pattern

India’s case is unique and, in some ways, precarious. It has the world’s sixth-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), spanning 2.37 million sq. km, alongside extensive undersea infrastructure that includes international submarine fibre-optic cables crucial for cloud services, financial markets, and defence data. Yet, no legal framework addresses the direct safeguarding of cables within Indian territorial waters or its EEZ.

Contrast this with Australia, which has established “Cable Protection Zones” under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These zones regulate activities around crucial undersea cables and ensure real-time monitoring. India, by comparison, has neither the designated zones nor robust surveillance systems. This gap leaves India’s maritime assets exposed—not just to accidental damage but potentially to sabotage by adversaries. What the Red Sea disruption underscores is a broader failure to anticipate risks tied to India’s geopolitical positioning in the Indian Ocean and its ambitions for a global Blue Economy.

The Machinery—or Absence of It—Behind India's Response

The 2020 Deep Ocean Mission (DOM), allocated ₹4,077 crore, represents India’s most concentrated effort to enhance underwater domain capabilities. The Matsya-6000 submersible, slated for a 2027 crewed mission, is a promising step toward indigenously developed subsea exploration. Trials of hydrophones achieving 5.5 km communication depth also show technological promise. But these advancements, while significant, remain largely research-oriented rather than geared toward cable protection or real-time infrastructure monitoring.

Operational deficits also loom large. India lacks indigenous cable repair vessels, relying on foreign-flags for maintenance. Restoration post-damage can take days—a timeline that is an eternity in systems relying on uninterrupted data flow. Equally concerning is the absence of acoustic and sensor grids that could detect disruptions in real-time. As it stands, India’s underwater monitoring infrastructure is reactive rather than proactive.

What the Data Actually Says and Why It Matters

The numbers paint a troubling picture. Despite China's massive leap with its “Underwater Great Wall” project—featuring seabed sensors and unmanned vehicles that monitor the Indo-Pacific—India has yet to deploy a comparable system across chokepoints like the Gulf of Mannar, the Malacca Strait, or the Arabian Sea. While the Matsya-6000 submersible signals technological intent, it is dwarfed by China's operational fleets of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and AI-driven surveillance grids.

Consider the Red Sea incident. Disruptions affected connectivity across three continents. India hosts 57 active undersea cables, yet no real-time engagement exists to mitigate risks posed by similar damages. The lack of cable-specific data or vulnerability mapping—despite repeated warnings from policymakers and maritime experts—embodies India's failure to operationalize comprehensive underwater domain awareness.

Uncomfortable Questions for India's Maritime Governance

The Red Sea disruption raises uncomfortable, yet necessary, questions. Why has India not fast-tracked legislation for “Cable Protection Zones”? An amendment to the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1976 could provide the legal backbone needed to regulate activities around critical cable networks. Why has coordination between strategic and civilian maritime bodies remained patchy at best? The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Earth Sciences rarely align operational priorities toward undersea infrastructure.

Then there’s the funding gap. ₹4,077 crore for DOM may seem significant, but it pales against the scale of infrastructure needed for real-time acoustic grids, predictive AI models, and satellite-linked subsea sensors. A piecemeal approach will not suffice; integration across ministries and a dedicated underwater security budget are necessary.

The timeline is sluggish as well. While Matsya-6000’s scheduled crewed deep-sea mission in 2027 is encouraging, executing deterrent underwater surveillance should not take until the next decade. India's dependence on foreign vessels for cable repairs is not just operational inefficiency—it undermines sovereignty.

Learning from Australia's Maritime Governance

Australia provides a concrete comparison for maritime governance done right. Through its legal provisions under UNCLOS, Australia enforces strict protections around submarine cable networks, reducing accidental and malicious damages. Further, its investment in autonomous underwater surveillance reflects a mature underwater domain awareness strategy. Real-time acoustic grids and predictive mapping systems allow damage or disruption to be detected in hours—not days.

India should not see Australia's capability merely as aspirational; it should view it as an attainable target. A specific legislative amendment to create Cable Protection Zones, paired with AI-driven surveillance and an indigenous repair fleet, could close the gap. But the gap is growing wider with every delay.

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