NAM Should Advance Goals of Global South

Why NAM's Call for Global South Unity Rings Hollow

At the 19th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) mid-term ministerial meeting on October 17, 2025, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs called on NAM members to “re-purpose” the movement to advance the aspirations of developing countries in the Global South. The rhetoric, however, struggles to align with the realities of NAM’s institutional shortcomings. With no permanent secretariat, budget, or binding decision-making framework, the movement remains a diffuse entity, largely symbolic in its current form.

The Minister’s remarks come at a crucial time. Over 120 NAM member states represent nearly two-thirds of UN membership, making it theoretically the largest voice of developing nations in multilateral fora. Yet NAM’s influence has steadily declined in the face of emerging coalitions like BRICS and the G20. NAM’s foundational principles—championed by India’s own Jawaharlal Nehru during the 1955 Bandung Conference—risk obsolescence as the very idea of "non-alignment" becomes increasingly unworkable in a multipolar, deeply interdependent world.

A Movement Without Machinery

Founded in 1961 with 25 initial members, NAM’s informal governance model now spans over 120 nations. Yet this expansion masks its critical structural flaw: decisions are made by consensus, and member states are bound not by legal obligations but by moral authority alone. The absence of institutional machinery—a permanent secretariat, operational budget, or enforcement mechanism—renders it ineffective in responding to dynamic geopolitical and economic challenges. Other multilateral forums like the UN Security Council or WTO, flawed as they are, still offer binding frameworks and enforceable decisions.

NAM’s governance contrasts sharply with forums like ASEAN, which has a secretariat in Jakarta that coordinates trade, diplomacy, and security initiatives among its members. While ASEAN members share regional proximity and economic objectives, NAM’s diversity—ranging from middle-income states like Argentina to low-income ones like Chad—means there is little coherence in setting priorities. The result is predictable: NAM’s declarations are often aspirational, not actionable.

The Fractured Reality of South-South Cooperation

While NAM ostensibly champions South-South cooperation, its track record is mixed. The Jakarta Declaration of 1992 called for addressing issues such as poverty, foreign debt, and technology transfer, but NAM has largely failed to deliver concrete solutions. Consider debt relief: as of 2023, low-income countries owed creditors a staggering $62 billion in external debt service annually, much of which goes unpaid. NAM has no mechanism to negotiate debt restructuring deals or mediate between debtor nations and creditors.

Technology transfer—a pillar of South-South cooperation—is equally disappointing. India’s International Solar Alliance (ISA), outside NAM’s framework, has done more to promote renewable energy accessibility in Global South countries than NAM has managed in decades. The irony here is that the ISA’s success could have been amplified by NAM, had it developed capacity to pool resources or coordinate action.

The rising influence of newer coalitions compounds NAM’s challenges. BRICS, explicitly formed to act as an economic counterweight to Western dominance, now boasts a New Development Bank ($100 billion capitalization). The G77 continues to lead UN deliberations on equity-rooted climate finance. NAM, meanwhile, remains conspicuously absent in these discussions despite its proclamations of fostering global equity.

India and NAM: Historic Framing vs Present Context

For India, NAM has always provided legitimacy as a leader of the developing world. The platform supports its calls for UN Security Council reforms and its advocacy for disarmament. However, India’s foreign policy priorities have shifted significantly under recent governments. The balancing act between NAM’s non-alignment principles and India’s deepening bilateral ties with both the U.S and Russia highlights strategic contradictions. India’s membership in the Quad and Indo-Pacific groupings reflects its pragmatic departure from rigid non-alignment.

India’s active involvement in South-South forums often happens outside NAM. Notable examples include its vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic and the India Africa Forum Summit. These initiatives underscore NAM’s marginal role in addressing contemporary challenges. One wonders whether NAM serves India better symbolically than strategically, especially as it increasingly anchors its global position through bilateral diplomacy instead of consensus-based multilateralism.

Why the Cuban Model Offers Lessons

For an international comparison, consider Cuba’s use of NAM. Cuba’s presidency in 2006 focused on tangible, localized development issues such as healthcare and education in the Global South. The Cuban model emphasized actionable projects under NAM’s umbrella, including direct medical cooperation agreements with countries in Africa and Latin America. While Cuba, with limited resources, showcased how NAM could drive localized development priorities, larger economies like India and Brazil have not leveraged NAM for similar purposes.

Critically, Cuba’s approach worked precisely because it opted for bilateral agreements rather than diffuse multilateralism. NAM’s rotational leadership system and lack of cohesive priorities mean such models have rarely been scaled. India’s push for repurposing NAM would need to target this structural incoherence directly.

Reforms or Retirement?

What would success for NAM look like today? Stronger institutional frameworks—perhaps a permanent secretariat and a coordinating body—would be an obvious starting point. Funding mechanisms to address NAM’s economic priorities, including concessional finance for climate adaptation and disaster resilience, could elevate its relevance substantially.

However, institutional overhaul is politically unlikely given NAM’s size and ideological diversity. The real reform might not lie in NAM itself but in integrating its ideals into action-oriented coalitions like BRICS and G77. Much depends on whether NAM can carve out niche political issues (disarmament, anti-imperialist advocacy) rather than attempting to compete with multipolar economic forums.

UPSC Integration: Questions for Future Civil Servants

• Prelims Question 1: The Bandung principles were adopted in which year? Correct Answer: 1955
• Prelims Question 2: Which of the following does NOT belong to the NAM principles adopted during the Bandung conference?
  • A. Mutual non-aggression
  • B. Respect for sovereignty
  • C. Formation of military alliances
  • D. Non-interference in internal affairs
  Correct Answer: C. Formation of military alliances

Mains Question: Assess the structural limitations of NAM in addressing the aspirations of the Global South in contemporary multipolar global order.

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