Law Ministry Defends its Simultaneous Polls Proposal

Law Ministry’s Defence of Simultaneous Polls: Constitutional Alignment or Federal Strain?

On November 28, 2025, the Union Law Ministry strongly reiterated its stance that the proposed Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Bill, 2024—known popularly as the "One Nation One Election" Bill—does not violate India’s basic structure doctrine. At the core of the debate is whether synchronising Lok Sabha and state assembly elections, in principle, complies with constitutional guarantees or dilutes federal autonomy. This proposal, due to its sweeping implications, remains one of the most contentious electoral reforms in recent history.

The Specific Case for Simultaneous Elections

Simultaneous elections, the Ministry argues, primarily seek to address India’s fragmented electoral calendar and its resulting inefficiencies. Articles 83(2) and 172(1) of the Constitution, which explicitly state that the terms of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies are five years "unless sooner dissolved," form the legal basis for re-synchronisation. The Ministry clarified that curtailing or extending the tenure of state legislatures to align with the Lok Sabha term is constitutionally permissible under these provisions. Key precedents, such as the 1967 general elections when both Lok Sabha and state assemblies held simultaneous polls, are cited as evidence of feasibility.

Beyond legal permissibility, cost rationalisation is being projected as a major advantage. Election expenditures in India have risen sharply—from ₹10,000 crore for the Lok Sabha election in 2014 to ₹60,000 crore in 2024 across all state and national elections combined. Simultaneous elections could pare down these costs significantly, reducing administrative burden. Additionally, frequent implementation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) disrupts governance cycles for months. Eliminating staggered election schedules, according to supporters, will end these interruptions, ensuring uninterrupted policy-making.

Finally, proponents argue that simultaneous elections offer clarity to the electorate, enabling voters to hold elected representatives accountable for national and state-level governance in one consolidated cycle.

The Federalism Conundrum: Robust Counterarguments

Critics, however, are far from convinced. The most glaring concern is its potential infringement on federal principles enshrined in the Constitution. Articles 73 and 162 demarcate the jurisdictions of the Union and State governments, with many states asserting autonomy in electoral decision-making as an inherent part of their constitutional identity. Synchronising elections necessarily entails curtailing the elected tenure of legislatures in some cases—a move that many argue encroaches unacceptably upon the autonomy of states.

Second, the logistical hurdles are daunting. India’s diverse electorate of over 937 million (2024 data) combined with wide regional disparities in electoral infrastructure creates challenges in designing an integrated electoral calendar. Centralising schedules could disproportionately benefit national political parties with extensive operational bandwidth, undermining the visibility of local and regional issues that tend to dominate state elections. This imbalance has often been contrasted against the experiences of states like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, where strong regional parties are built on addressing state-specific concerns.

Another risk involves the possibility of reduced accountability between electoral cycles. India’s fragmented elections, while costly, impose regular accountability checks on both state and national representatives. Synchronising them risks creating long governance gaps where neither tier faces direct electoral scrutiny.

What Other Democracies Did: A Case Study in Germany

The closest international parallel is Germany, which has a federal structure and holds Bundestag (federal parliament) and Landtag (state legislature) elections in staggered cycles. Germany faced similar fragmentation issues, leading to debates on synchronisation during the 1990s. While some state legislatures realigned their elections voluntarily to coincide with Bundestag polls, constitutional autonomy ensured that the choice remained state-specific. The result? High costs persist but governance accountability is viewed as robust, with states able to freely separate regional and national policy debates.

India’s exercise deviates sharply from the German model in its push for constitutional amendments—an approach with evident potential to impose top-down uniformity. Whether this departure is prudent remains debatable.

Where Things Stand: Risks of Centralisation

It is clear that simultaneous elections have undeniable logistical, financial, and governance benefits. But the Law Ministry’s framing of the issue as non-violative of basic structure understates broader risks—particularly those rooted in federalism and diversity. Moreover, the reliance on Article 83(2) and 172(1), while significant, does not resolve deeper concerns about the forced curtailment of legislative terms. The Joint Parliamentary Committee’s plans to consult stakeholders, including the Election Commission and the 23rd Law Commission on December 4, may provide clarity, but institutional skepticism about smooth implementation persists.

Ultimately, any attempt at electoral realignment must grapple with India’s unique operating context. The success of simultaneous elections hinges not just on constitutional validity but on political consensus, which appears elusive.

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