ISRO’s PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 Mission Experienced an Anomaly During the Third Stage

Two Failures in a Row: The Anomaly in ISRO's PSLV-C62 Mission

On January 13, 2026, ISRO’s first launch of the year, the PSLV-C62 mission, failed to place its 16 satellites into the intended orbit, marking the second consecutive failure of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Despite being dubbed ISRO’s “workhorse,” the PSLV experienced an anomaly during its third stage—a critical juncture that determines flight trajectory—ending hopes for the successful delivery of the EOS-N1 Earth observation satellite and 15 co-passenger satellites.

A Break with Past Patterns

For a launch vehicle that boasts a historically high success rate, this second failure in consecutive missions challenges ISRO’s reputation for reliability. Since October 1994, PSLV has completed 64 missions, supporting space exploration milestones like Chandrayaan-1 (2008) and the Mars Orbiter Mission (2013). But with this failure coming on the heels of the PSLV-C61 setback just months earlier, the question arises: is the platform’s design aging, or are we witnessing operational lapses?

EOS-N1 was no trivial payload. This Earth observation satellite was intended for environmental monitoring, resource mapping, and disaster management—functions central to India’s developmental imperatives. A dedicated mission for such crucial objectives makes the failure sting harder, particularly when paired with the growing costs of launch failures for the NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), the commercial arm of ISRO.

Critics will point to one trend: ISRO’s organizational pivot toward commercial satellite launches under NSIL. While bringing revenue and global recognition, this approach subtly shifts the focus away from cutting-edge research and risk mitigation for mission-critical launches such as EOS-N1. The second anomaly raises urgent questions about prioritizing profit over reliability.

What Went Wrong in the Machinery?

The third stage of PSLV employs solid propulsion and is responsible for rapidly increasing the rocket’s horizontal speed to place it on a sub-orbital trajectory. According to ISRO’s statement after the failure, early data pointed to an “unexpected loss of velocity,” likely because of irregular fuel burn during this stage. Yet, details remain opaque—ISRO has offered no clarity on whether the issue lies in the quality of solid fuel, engine design, or stage separation mechanics.

Such anomalies are rare in ISRO’s decades-long operations but not unprecedented. What makes this concerning is timing. PSLV launched under NSIL’s commercial mandate while carrying Kestrel Initial Technology Demonstrator (KID), a technology prototype from Spain meant to test re-entry systems. The interplay of commercial ambitions and technological demonstration leaves open the possibility of lower scrutiny on quality assurance, something otherwise sacrosanct in ISRO’s exploratory missions.

The failure underscores institutional gaps because PSLV operates within a defined budget—an estimated ₹200 crores per launch—which, while economical by global standards, may be insufficient to sustain rigorous pre-launch troubleshooting for increasingly complex payload missions. The question remains: was budget or procurement pressure a factor?

What the Data Actually Reveals

ISRO’s official failure report is awaited, but some patterns emerge from the past. The PSLV-C61/EOS-07 failure in September 2025 also involved irregular fuel dynamics—then attributed to a flawed second-stage liquid propulsion system. This suggests systemic disparities in propulsion management across stages, possibly compounded by aging technological underpinnings.

Consider economic implications. According to NSIL’s 2022-23 annual budget, revenues rose nearly 15% year-on-year from commercial launches, but expenditure escalations—specifically for maintaining PSLV—often exceeded projections. EOS-N1’s launch failure might not translate directly into financial loss, but reputational damage lowers trust among potential international clients like Spain’s KID collaborators, risking long-term revenue flow.

Meanwhile, data from the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), which coordinates applications for satellites like EOS-N1, showed a 22% delay in resource-mapping projects in 2022-23. Further satellite deployment setbacks could spiral into resource-monitoring gaps, exacerbating existing delays in disaster management systems critical to states like Odisha and Kerala.

The Uncomfortable Questions: Institutional Slack or Systemic Stress?

Behind the numbers lies a tougher truth. ISRO’s transition to NSIL for commercial operations has introduced unresolved friction between the objectives of profitability versus institutional self-sufficiency. How far has NSIL optimized launch missions without compromising ISRO’s traditional ethos of meticulous risk management? No public audit addresses this tension to date.

Even design-wise, PSLV’s utility might be nearing obsolescence, especially as competitor countries move toward reusable launch systems. China’s Long March 8 rockets—designed for similar payload sizes—offer partial reusability and higher launch frequency, adding to India’s competitive pressure. South Korea’s Nuri rocket achieved modest success in low-Earth orbital payloads by integrating modular designs, contrasting PSLV's rigid four-stage architecture.

Political timing adds complexity. With global agencies like NASA and ESA increasingly formalizing partnerships with private firms for satellite launches, India’s retention of ISRO’s primacy as sole manufacturer-doer may risk stagnation. An alternative approach—outsourcing rocket fabrication to private players like Antrix Corporation—could accelerate innovation but risks greater regulatory oversight gaps.

Comparative Perspectives: Lessons from South Korea

When South Korea faced reliability doubts about its space program in 2015, it launched intensive quality control monitoring for rockets like Nuri. This included increased budget allocations (+45%) toward propulsion optimization and engaging external engineering audits for regulatory compliance. By 2021, Nuri faced anomalies but recovered in the subsequent launch cycle through technical overhaul programs within 15 months.

The lesson for ISRO is structural: while NSIL’s commercial drive undoubtedly brings short-term benefits, replicating South Korea’s external audit mechanisms could lend ISRO technological resilience and third-party validation—especially critical for platforms like PSLV that lack versatility for higher payload missions.

Exam Questions

• Prelims Question 1: Which stage of PSLV uses cryogenic engines?
  (a) First stage (b) Second stage (c) Third stage (d) None
  Correct Answer: (d) None.
• Prelims Question 2: What is the payload capacity of LVM-3 to geostationary orbit?
  (a) 1,750 kg (b) 4,000 kg (c) 2,200 kg (d) 8,000 kg
  Correct Answer: (b) 4,000 kg.

Mains Question: To what extent has ISRO's reliance on the PSLV constrained the technological evolution of India’s space program? Critically evaluate with reference to recent mission failures.

Practice Questions for UPSC

Prelims Practice Questions

Frequently Asked Questions