From the High Seas to Sovereign Shores: INS Vaibhav's Return Flags Both Triumph and Transition

On March 2, 2026, INSV Kaundinya, India’s indigenously-built sail training ship, is set to dock at Mumbai Harbour after completing her maiden circumnavigation of the globe. The voyage, which spanned a gruelling 21 months and covered over 45,000 nautical miles, stands as a testament to India's drive for blue-water naval capabilities and maritime diplomacy. The ship’s crew, comprising 12 naval officers including three women, successfully navigated complex maritime conditions across the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. Embedded in the triumph, however, lies a broader discourse—what does such a mission achieve beyond symbolism? Is there a discernible ROI on such voyages for national security and policy objectives?

The Policy Instrument: Maritime Diplomacy Meets Naval Pragmatism

The INSV Kaundinya is not merely a sail training ship; it symbolizes India’s ambitions in showcasing indigenous technological and shipbuilding prowess. Commissioned into the Indian Navy in 2023 and built at the Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), the vessel weighs 118 tonnes and extends 28 meters in length. This circumnavigation comes on the heels of Prime Minister Modi’s statement at the Indian Ocean Conference in 2024, where he linked maritime dominance with regional security and "acting east" strategy. Alongside warships and commissioned submarines, assets like Kaundinya are soft-power instruments in asserting India’s presence across global waterways.

Budgetary allocations also tell a relevant side of the story. For FY 2025-26, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) allocated ₹52,000 crore solely for capital outlay on the Navy, a 13.6% increase from the previous fiscal year. While a fraction of this goes towards soft-power operations like Kaundinya, critics argue that such missions occasionally divert funds from core combat preparedness. The MoD counters that the budget for naval preparedness and soft-power diplomacy must not be mutually exclusive.

The Case For: Showcasing Capability and Building Strategy

The strongest justification for missions like Kaundinya’s circumnavigation lies in their multi-pronged utility. First, these voyages are proof of India’s capacity for indigenization. Sail training vessels such as the Kaundinya and its predecessor, the INSV Tarini, are crucial narratives against global shipbuilding powerhouses—China, South Korea, and Japan. The state-run GSL built the ship with almost 96% locally sourced materials, underscoring “Atmanirbhar Bharat” in defense production.

Second, circumnavigation operations enhance geopolitical soft power. The Kaundinya docked in 15 countries during its journey, strengthening bilateral ties through naval diplomacy. Training collaborations with countries like Mauritius and Seychelles during these halts are part of India’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy. The recent Quad Joint Naval Exercise (2025) saw India revising its operational positioning maps for strategic choke points such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.

Finally, operationally taxing expeditions like this hone manpower. Crews learn navigational precision, resource optimization, and teamwork under dire circumstances. The Indian Navy noted an 8% improvement in success rates of complex maritime exercises post-such training missions.

The Case Against: A Critique of Expenditure and Execution

Despite the triumphalism, skepticism surrounding expeditions like the Kaundinya’s is unavoidable, especially when national maritime ambitions face resource constraints. Unlike combat-ready fleets, sail training vessels contribute little directly to force multiplication. While the narrative of maritime diplomacy is attractive, its tangible outcomes are difficult to quantify. For instance, during its circumnavigation, the Kaundinya skipped docking at West African ports citing “diplomatic logistics”—a missed opportunity to cement ties with key countries in Africa's Indian Ocean Belt.

Second, operational costs raise difficult budgeting questions. Maintaining a vessel like Kaundinya for a global circumnavigation reportedly cost ₹250 crore between logistical support, fuel safety contingencies, and diplomatic facilitation. Was this expenditure proportional to the diplomatic returns?

Finally, the institutional asymmetry between India’s ostensible soft-power projection and the decisive hard-power deficit cannot be ignored. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (2025) criticized the Navy’s inability to expedite its share in stalled submarine acquisitions, which could cripple operational efficacy in any prolonged conflict along the peninsular region.

International Comparison: Brazil’s 'Cisne Branco' Model

A useful comparison can be drawn with Brazil’s training vessel, the Navio Veleiro Cisne Branco. Commissioned in 2000, this sailboat has been a centerpiece of Brazilian naval diplomacy. Unlike episodic circumventions like the Kaundinya, the Branco has a consistent strategic footprint, engaging with Latin American, African, and European allies annually. Brazil also links such missions to civilian maritime training initiatives, thereby expanding the utility of operations beyond the military domain.

While both nations view sail training programs as arenas of potential statecraft, Brazil’s model of integrating diplomatic and civilian collaborations lends greater sustainability. India's approach, on the other hand, retains a sporadic push, driven more by momentary optics than durable frameworks.

Where Things Stand: Strategic Value Meets Real-world Constraints

The docking of Kaundinya at Mumbai Harbour is undoubtedly a symbolic moment. Yet, symbolism alone cannot dictate maritime agency. If circumnavigation voyages are to be more than theatrical exercises, India must re-evaluate how they connect to broader strategic goals, especially amidst budgetary trade-offs within the Navy itself. As things stand, India risks spending generously on optics while undermining its capacity for deterrence-based maritime preparedness.

Critically, alignments between Prime Ministerial maritime narratives and bureaucratic execution must be sharper. The Defence Ministry and stakeholder institutions like the GSL must ensure that soft-power projection does not dilute concerted focus on hard-power upgradation—a balancing act India has yet to master.

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