India Committed to Idea of Open and Rules-based Oceans

India's Commitments to Open Oceans: Words Stronger than Strategy?

On December 4, 2025, President Droupadi Murmu reiterated India's commitment to the Indian Ocean as an “open, stable, and rules-based” maritime space. This statement underscores the geostrategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which facilitates 50% of global container traffic and 80% of seaborne oil trade. Yet, behind this declarative commitment lies the question: Is India adequately equipped, strategically and institutionally, to protect its vision of maritime order from challenges ranging from Chinese incursions to transnational crime?

The Indian Ocean spans one-fifth of the earth's surface, touching 36 nations and serving as a lifeline for nearly 2.5 billion people — 35% of the global population. With maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca Strait controlling critical trade and energy flows, India's central position gives it both leverage and responsibility. The Navy's focus on securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs) against threats like piracy, terrorism, and illegal trafficking has reinforced India’s maritime role, but the deeper structural and strategic issues plaguing the region demand a closer examination.

India's Framework for Maritime Security

At the heart of India's approach to the Indian Ocean is the **Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)**, hatched in 2019 at the East Asia Summit. This initiative prioritizes maritime security, resource sharing, ecological sustainability, connectivity, disaster risk reduction, and freer trade flows. The more recent **MAHASAGAR** policy (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth for All in the Region) extends these aspirations, presenting India as the guarantor of stability in the region.

In the institutional realm, the Indian Navy remains the core operational arm. With projects like commissioning indigenous warships such as **INS Vikrant** and **INS Visakhapatnam**, naval modernisation is visibly underway. The Navy’s doctrine has expanded to proactively address multiple dimensions of maritime security: a **$18.5 billion defence allocation for naval infrastructure in FY 2024-25** signals intent, if not total sufficiency.

Regionally, India has strengthened multilateral engagements via the **Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)** and **Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)**. The *Colombo Security Conclave* aligns maritime-focused nations like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Bangladesh under India’s strategic umbrella. Initiatives feature anti-piracy activities, maritime domain awareness, and joint disaster response coordination. Yet, these frameworks rely heavily on voluntary contributions and diplomatic buy-ins, leaving room for competing foreign influences—particularly China's multi-layered maritime ambitions.

The Chinese Shadow and India's Response

The single biggest disruptor in the IOR today remains China. By strategically financing and operationalising ports under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has drawn IOR littoral states into its orbit. Ports like Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa stand not only as economic assets but potential military footholds. China’s deployment of “scientific” research vessels for undersea mapping raises flags about compromised maritime domain awareness across these waters.

India’s countermeasures center on indigenous shipbuilding and naval deployments, increased diplomatic engagement with island states, and joint naval exercises (e.g., the Quad’s **Malabar Exercise**). Establishing **logistical agreements** with key IOR nations, such as Seychelles and Maldives, has also functioned as a check. However, questions remain about the dilatory pace of India’s overall naval expansion. For example, while India presides over a substantial coastline of 7,500 kilometers, it fields fewer combat-ready warships than does China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

A Gap Between Intent and Execution?

Despite its rhetoric, India faces several impediments. First, the **bureaucratic entanglement** of maritime policymaking weakens synergy. Responsibility is fragmented across the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Shipping, and Ministry of External Affairs, among others. This inter-ministerial overlap leads to coordination bottlenecks when rapid response is essential, such as during natural disasters or security breaches in the IOR.

Additionally, the focus on domestic shipbuilding comes with delays and cost overruns. The indigenous **INS Vikrant**, for instance, took over 13 years to commission. Such timelines are unsustainable in the context of rapid Chinese naval escalation, whose shipyards produce vessels at unmatched speed.

Then there is the issue of littoral state alignment. India's efforts via the IORA and IONS hinge on the goodwill and stability of member nations, several of whom court Chinese aid for infrastructure development. While India's HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) initiatives are appreciated, they often fail to match the financial quantum of Chinese investment. For instance, Sri Lanka's dependence on Chinese credit despite Indian debt relief exposes limits to India's economic leverages.

Lessons From Japan

One instructive parallel lies in **Japan**, a fellow Indo-Pacific stakeholder and staunch advocate for open seas. Historically energy-insecure, Japan has built a robust naval architecture complemented by strong alliances (chiefly the U.S.). Tokyo’s approach to defending SLOCs is rooted in multilateral legal backing — through the **UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)**, which explicitly supports maritime freedoms.

India's problem lies in being more reactive than preventive. Unlike Japan, India does not sufficiently leverage international legal frameworks like UNCLOS to diplomatically isolate China’s grey-zone activities in the IOR, such as fake oceanographic surveys. While Japan also contributes consistently to technology transfers and capacity building in strategic geographies, India’s efforts in these domains remain geographically limited and budgetarily constrained.

What Should Success Look Like?

India’s claim to “open and rules-based” seas must go beyond declarative diplomacy. Operationally, we need to assess the success of naval modernisation chiefly on four metrics: speed of indigenous shipbuilding, effectiveness of naval operations like anti-piracy and surveillance, regional buy-in for frameworks like MAHASAGAR, and India’s positioning in global maritime negotiating tables.

Second, economic diplomacy in the IOR must match security ambitions. India’s competitors, particularly China, weaponise economic aid to achieve diplomatic leverage. Addressing vulnerabilities—like debt dependence among IOR island nations—through strategically targeted infrastructure investment would lend credibility to India’s broader vision.

Finally, institutional reforms must rationalise inter-agency coordination within India. Consolidating maritime policymaking under a singular policy framework (be it via a National Maritime Commission) would help better align defense, trade, and ecological objectives across the Indian Ocean.

Exam Connections

• Prelims Question 1: Which of the following chokepoints are located in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?
  1) Strait of Hormuz
  2) Bab-el-Mandeb
  3) Strait of Malacca
  4) Panama Canal
  Answer: 1, 2, 3
• Prelims Question 2: The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was first announced by India in:
  a) 2015
  b) 2017
  c) 2019
  d) 2021
  Answer: c) 2019

Mains Question: "To what extent has India’s policy framework effectively addressed the geopolitical and security challenges posed by rising Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean Region? Evaluate the structural and strategic limitations within the current approach."

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