India and Greece Bilateral Ties

A Strategic Partnership Marked by Ambition: India and Greece Deepen Defence and Economic Ties

On February 10, 2026, India and Greece formalised plans to advance their bilateral relationship through a Joint Declaration of Intent on Defence Industrial Cooperation and the exchange of a Bilateral Military Cooperation Plan for 2026. This marked a significant step toward institutionalising a five-year strategic roadmap that promises intensified defence collaboration, with possible ramifications for both countries’ positions in their respective geopolitical theatres—the Indo-Pacific and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Why This Breaks the Mould

India-Greece ties, though generally cordial, have often lacked depth and visibility in comparison to India's relations with countries in other parts of Europe, such as France or Germany. Since 2023, however, the upgrade of this relationship to a Strategic Partnership has pushed the boundaries of what had, until recently, been largely stagnant bilateral ties. The backdrop for this shift is Greece’s increasing importance as a gateway to the European Union (EU), coupled with shared values around a multipolar world order, sovereignty, and rules-based engagement.

Defence collaboration is not entirely new. Greece was among the rare European nations to support India following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests in 1998, signing an MoU on defence cooperation precisely at a moment when international pressure on India was at its peak. The shared participation in naval and air force exercises such as INIOCHOS-23, INIOCHOS-24, and INIOCHOS-25 has further demonstrated convergence, particularly in the Mediterranean region. However, what makes this agreement notable is its explicit emphasis on co-production, aligning with India’s Make in India initiative—a move likely aimed at reducing dependence on traditional arms importers.

The Institutional Framework

Several bodies and mechanisms will now be tasked with operationalising the agreements. The Joint Declaration of Intent directly aligns Greece with India's defence industrial framework under the Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP), 2020. This policy is designed to position India as a global defence hub with clear targets: achieving a turnover of ₹1,75,000 crore in defence manufacturing by 2025 and ₹35,000 crore in exports.

Additionally, Greece’s inclusion in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has introduced new avenues for maritime logistics. Ports like Alexandroupolis and Thessaloniki are being considered as critical European gateway points for Indian goods and energy supplies, particularly given Greece’s geographical proximity to Central and Eastern Europe. If operationalised effectively, this could lend India greater leverage within the EU, beyond its traditional reliance on partners such as France and Germany.

Ground Reality: What the Data Shows

The aspirations are clear, but the numbers reveal both promise and limitations. Bilateral trade, though slated for expansion, stands at a modest USD 2 billion (FY 2022-23). Even more telling is the absence of direct air connectivity between the countries, a logistical gap that curtails deeper tourism and business exchanges.

While Greece is emerging as a popular tourist destination for Indians, contributing to its tourism revenue which accounts for 25% of Greece’s GDP, the lack of robust people-to-people connections is a persistent issue. As of 2023, the Indian diaspora in Greece was estimated to be fewer than 15,000 individuals—a negligible figure compared to other EU nations.

The gap extends to trade logistics as well. Greece’s ports, despite their importance to the proposed IMEC corridor, remain underdeveloped in terms of India-specific trade routes. For instance, less than 4% of Indian exports to the EU utilise passage through Greek ports. This underscores the need for prioritising infrastructure integration before strategic ambitions can fully materialise.

Uncomfortable Questions Nobody Is Asking

Despite the apparent goodwill, several challenges require closer scrutiny. Firstly, the spectre of third-party influences looms large. Greece’s historical tensions with Türkiye—a country central to India’s balancing strategy in West Asia—might complicate New Delhi’s ability to engage freely in bilateral projects. The intricate geopolitics of the Mediterranean often pits Greece against Türkiye over issues like maritime boundaries, forcing India to walk a tightrope.

Another blind spot is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Greece is heavily indebted to Chinese investments, especially in maritime infrastructure, with Beijing holding a significant stake in the strategic Port of Piraeus. India’s attempts to position itself as Greece’s preferred partner in the defence or maritime domain will inevitably meet resistance, not only from Beijing but also from sections within Greece that benefit from Chinese economic largesse.

Finally, India’s ambitions for long-term defence co-production with Greece appear optimistic given the disparity in their existing defence-industrial capabilities. Greece’s defence manufacturing output is geared primarily toward NATO standards—how these align with India’s regulatory framework remains an open question.

A Comparative Anchor: South Korea's Bilateral Template

India’s burgeoning partnership with Greece in defence mirrors its older defence-industrial cooperation with South Korea. In 2019, both nations signed an agreement focusing on military co-production and technology transfers, with a notable emphasis on small arms and naval technology. South Korea proved pragmatic by focusing on tangible, achievable projects such as building indigenous naval systems for the Indian Navy. Greece, by contrast, faces institutional hurdles that South Korea did not: lower defence R&D capacity and more burdensome NATO-centric regulatory standards.

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