IBSA Dialogue Forum and Equitable Global Governance

The IBSA Push for UNSC Reform: A Global Imperative or a Persistent Stalemate?

On 24 November 2025, during the IBSA Leaders’ Summit coinciding with the first G20 Summit held in Johannesburg, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that reforms of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are no longer optional but an urgent necessity. His pitch highlighted the glaring disconnect between the current UNSC structure, crafted in 1945, and the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. The Summit also saw India advocating security cooperation, technology-led development, and climate-resilient agriculture under the IBSA framework—a South-South cooperation platform linking India, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet, beneath the optimism lies the larger question: Can IBSA truly push for equitable global governance, or is it a voice muted by geopolitical inertia?

Why This Breaks From the Pattern

IBSA’s renewed vigor for UNSC reform reflects two major shifts. First, India’s emphasis on leveraging platforms like IBSA to advance Global South interests challenges the dominance of North-centric global governance. Second, the summit’s timing during the G20—a grouping with its own power dynamics—gives IBSA a unique opportunity to amplify its demands for inclusivity.

This contrasts starkly with the historical pattern of IBSA summits, which often focused on internal cooperation in development and humanitarian aid. While the IBSA Trust Fund, operational since 2006, has financed over 40 development projects worldwide, its advocacy for institutional reform has largely stayed overshadowed by other multilateral pressure groups, such as BRICS. The 2025 Summit marks a pivot: UNSC reform was framed not as a moral argument but as practical exigency. This is a departure from earlier, softer rhetoric.

Similarly, India’s proposal to institutionalize an IBSA NSA-level coordination mechanism on terrorism signals a deepening of security cooperation among the troika—another deviation from IBSA’s traditionally economic and developmental tilt. Are these shifts indicative of IBSA attempting to translate talk into tangible influence? Skepticism lingers.

The Institutional Machinery at Work

At its core, the advocacy for UNSC reform revolves around international law and multilateral diplomacy—the UN Charter itself and General Assembly procedural dynamics. The Council, established under Chapter V of the UN Charter, remains dominated by its P5 members—the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China—who wield veto power. India, Brazil, and South Africa have long been vocal about the inadequacy of this structure to address contemporary challenges.

The road to reform, however, is obstructed by entrenched resistance from various quarters. IBSA’s challenge lies in navigating the procedural labyrinth, particularly in engaging not just the General Assembly but also overcoming the veto-wielding influence of the P5. Additionally, India’s bid for permanent membership aligns with the aspirations of the G4 grouping (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) but is opposed by the Coffee Club (Uniting for Consensus group), including countries like Pakistan and Italy, who argue that permanent membership expansion is unwarranted.

Critical mechanisms, such as regular South-South dialogue through IBSA and platforms like the UN General Assembly, are crucial. However, India’s call for practical alignment—for instance, proposing IBSA-backed initiatives like digital public infrastructure and climate-resilient agriculture—suggests a strategy to bolster legitimacy through developmental leadership first, reforms later.

What the Data Actually Says

The case for UNSC reform is bolstered by three key realities:

• India's contribution to peacekeeping operations ranks among the highest globally, with over 200,000 personnel deployed since 1950.
• The UNSC's decision-making disproportionately benefits P5 members; since 1980, the U.S. has exercised its veto power 16 times, frequently impacting resolutions important to developing nations.
• Bilateral trade between IBSA nations crossed USD 42 billion in 2024, underscoring their collective economic clout but also the disparity in their representation on multilateral platforms.

Yet, these numbers underline the irony of the IBSA pitch. Despite its commitment to multilateralism, IBSA nations—including India's ambitious climate funding proposal—still face stark domestic inequalities that undermine their attempts to project themselves as equitable reform advocates. This disjuncture is rarely addressed.

The Uncomfortable Questions

The optimism surrounding IBSA’s push for global governance reform obscures critical flaws. Firstly, despite India’s proposal for an IBSA NSA-level mechanism, trilateral security cooperation could risk redundancy, given overlapping strategic initiatives under BRICS, the Quad, and other regional arrangements. What makes IBSA distinct?

Secondly, the roadmap for institutional reforms is strikingly vague. India’s bold assertions about UNSC reform overlook institutional disagreements: Should new permanent members have veto powers? How will African representation be structured? What safeguards are proposed to avoid cronyism?

Thirdly, the inherent asymmetry within IBSA itself deserves scrutiny. India’s economic size dwarfs Brazil’s and South Africa’s on most metrics—India’s GDP stands at approximately $3.7 trillion compared to Brazil’s $2 trillion and South Africa’s $400 billion (2024 data). Does IBSA truly reflect equitable trilateral governance, or is it skewed in favor of Indian ambitions?

The Comparative Anchor: South Korea's Lessons

South Korea’s experience illustrates a pointed contrast. In 2018, Seoul strategically leveraged its national contributions—technology innovation and peace initiatives with North Korea—to gain a non-permanent UNSC seat with overwhelming General Assembly support. It also nurtured alliances through U.S.-aligned regional pacts like CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific).

IBSA nations, in contrast, have failed to articulate precise regional coalitions capable of buttressing their case for reform. What South Korea’s example underscores, therefore, is the importance of aligning reform demands with demonstrable leadership within existing institutional frameworks. This is where IBSA risks overstretch without strategic clarity.

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