High Seas Treaty of UN Reaches Entry into Force Threshold

The High Seas Treaty Crosses Ratification Threshold—A Watershed Moment or a Mirage?

On 22 September 2025, the High Seas Treaty, formally known as the “Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)”, secured its 61st ratification. Morocco and Sierra Leone deposited their instruments of accession last week, triggering the countdown to its entry into force in January 2026. This milestone raises critical questions about its implementation and efficacy—for a treaty that promises to reshape ocean governance, nearly four decades after the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The symbolic triumph of 61 ratifications, however, is tempered by the sobering fact that only 1.44% of the high seas currently have any form of protection. Against this backdrop, the BBNJ Treaty must achieve more than just ceremonial inclusion in international law—it has to deliver results on its mandates for Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and equitable sharing of Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs). The road ahead is riddled with operational hurdles, geopolitical tensions, and incomplete groundwork.

An Institutional Architecture for the Commons?

The High Seas Treaty builds upon the legal foundation of UNCLOS, which has governed oceanic rights and responsibilities since 1994. Unlike UNCLOS—often dubbed the “Constitution for the Oceans”—the BBNJ Treaty zeroes in on areas beyond national jurisdiction, seeking to formalize rules for biodiversity conservation, capacity-building, and access-sharing. According to the UN requirements, the treaty will enter into force 120 days after the 60th ratification. This makes January 2026 the effective start of its legally binding provisions.

The institutional framework envisioned under the treaty includes:

• Mandatory establishment of MPAs in international waters, addressing the stark reality that only 1.89% of oceans globally are no-take MPAs.
• A mechanism for sharing benefits of MGRs, which has long been a contentious issue between developed and developing countries.
• Requirements for EIAs before activities such as deep-sea mining, carbon sequestration, or large-scale industrial fishing.
• Scientific cooperation and technology transfer directives aimed at strengthening the capacity of developing nations.

While these provisions sound promising on paper, they raise questions about enforceability, funding, and oversight. The treaty leaves room for ambiguity regarding dispute resolution mechanisms—a potential Achilles' heel when competing claims arise.

Numbers vs Realities: What Do the Metrics Hide?

The treaty’s target of protecting 30% of the world’s oceans by 2030, aligned with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, is laudable. But the commitment feels marred by historical challenges. Consider the current status: 6.35% of the world’s oceans are protected, far short of the 30% target. Worse, protection remains largely nominal in many cases, with questionable enforcement and inadequate funding.

The issue of resource sharing is equally contentious. For years, debates around MGRs revolved around two main questions: Who owns genetic material extracted from the high seas? And how do technological advances benefit all parties equitably? Developed countries, led by technology giants such as Japan and the United States, have long held a monopoly on marine biotechnology patents. Fair and equitable sharing in these circumstances might need stronger mechanisms than what the treaty currently proposes.

There is skepticism too on how MPAs will be operationalized. Efforts to protect marine biodiversity are crippled by persistent illegal fishing, particularly in the Indian Ocean—an area where insufficient monitoring and diplomatic indifference have allowed violations to flourish. Tools like Environmental Impact Assessments, as mandated by the treaty, must contend with countries hesitant to disclose activities carried out in sensitive geographies, such as areas adjacent to EEZs.

Structural Tensions Threatening Implementation

One of the most glaring structural tensions is the disparity between geopolitical interests and conservation goals. For example, deep-sea mining—a lucrative prospect for states and private firms—has the potential to derail biodiversity protection efforts even before the treaty’s first Conference of Parties (COP1) convenes. In this scenario, poorer nations seeking economic dividends might be pressured by multinational corporations or richer states to prioritize revenue over ecological imperatives.

Moreover, the treaty does little to address the longstanding issue of underfunded ocean conservation programs. Without a robust financing mechanism, especially for developing countries, the treaty risks falling into the trap of making promises that cannot be delivered. The resource-intensive nature of monitoring international waters further complicates the issue; recent projects under UNCLOS have demonstrated gaps in technical capacity and political will.

Additionally, there is potential overlap and friction between the treaty’s governance structure and existing frameworks under UNCLOS. Inter-ministerial coordination—particularly among agencies tackling biodiversity, fisheries management, and climate change—remains a complex puzzle, one that each signatory state must solve individually.

Lessons from Norway: A Benchmark in High Seas Governance

Norway offers an instructive example of successful marine governance. With its progressive stance on ocean management, the country has pioneered marine spatial planning and established expansive MPAs backed by stringent monitoring protocols. Norway’s funding mechanisms are equally noteworthy; by leveraging its sovereign wealth fund, it has sustainably financed marine research and conservation while ensuring compliance. Contrast this with nations struggling under resource shortages—India included—and the limitations of the BBNJ Treaty become stark.

However, replicating Norway’s model might be unrealistic for most treaty parties. Financial resources aside, Norway’s success leans heavily on political cohesion and its low levels of dependency on extractive industries—a dynamic absent in resource-strapped developing countries.

What Will Measure Success?

The High Seas Treaty entering into force by January 2026 is arguably a historic achievement in international environmental law. But success should be judged by outcomes, not ratification numbers. Effective implementation demands answers to fundamental questions: Will nations actually create and enforce high-quality MPAs? Can capacity-building initiatives reach poorer states in time to meet the treaty’s 2030 biodiversity targets? Will mechanisms for equitable benefit-sharing truly work in a global landscape dominated by private patent holders?

Metrics should include tangible reductions in illegal activities in the high seas, the quantity and quality of MPA protections, and increased participation by developing nations in marine genetic research. Without these indicators, the treaty risks becoming another case study in overpromising and under-delivering.

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