Future of India-Bangladesh Relationship: Parliamentary Committee on MEA

Bilateral Unease in Dhaka: Strategic Erosion for India?

On December 5, 2025, anti-India demonstrations brought traffic across Dhaka to a grinding halt. Thousands protested outside the Indian High Commission, galvanizing sentiment against New Delhi’s perceived interference in Bangladeshi politics. The backdrop was turbulent: Sheikh Hasina’s sentencing to death for alleged insurrections, the interim government’s ban on the Awami League, and the emergence of the National Citizen Party (NCP) — a political entity with overt leanings towards Beijing and Islamabad.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs warns this marks India’s steepest strategic challenge in Bangladesh since the 1971 Liberation War. However, the flashpoints rooted in 2024’s regime change demand scrutiny not merely as singular episodes but as ominous harbingers of a structural shift in our neighborhood diplomacy. Bangladesh, once a cornerstone ally under Hasina, is charting a trajectory that prioritizes nationalism and diverges from India-aligned cooperation. The erosion signals far-reaching implications for India’s objectives, from connectivity projects to counterterrorism frameworks.

Stumbling Blocks for Connectivity and Economic Integration

It is essential to dissect the institutional framework underpinning India’s engagements with Bangladesh, particularly in connectivity and economic cooperation. Historically, bilateral ties flourished under the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace of 1972, evolving into a robust partnership encompassing development loans, logistical integration, and trade agreements. The pivot had practical milestones: rehabilitation of six rail links from the pre-1965 era, Chittagong and Mongla ports opened to reduce transit costs, and an annual trade volume scaling to $14 billion by FY 2023-24.

Projects like the Dhaka-Kolkata express cargo corridor and the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline (which delivered high-speed diesel) symbolized convergence. However, these high-stakes initiatives are now precariously positioned under Dhaka’s nationalist interim government that has deprioritized cooperation with India. With political instability choking diplomatic bandwidth, vital infrastructure projects could stall or face outright rejection by the incoming NCP-led administration.

Rising Foreign Influences: Chinese and Turkish Leverage

The report flags increasing Chinese and Turkish engagement as crucial disruptors. Turkish defense projects and China’s Belt and Road Initiative-sponsored infrastructure investments have made significant inroads, tilting Dhaka’s strategic calculus toward alternatives. The case of China here is emblematic: Beijing already has deep stakes in port developments, highway constructions, and even direct political lobbying through soft power. Not surprisingly, Bangladesh’s interim government has rapidly tapped into Chinese credit lines, reducing dependence on Indian financial and technical expertise.

A striking comparison is Cambodia. Beijing’s dominance in Cambodia’s economic sectors mirrors what could unfold in Bangladesh. In Phnom Penh, Chinese investments reshaped political allegiances, sidelining more balanced geostrategic ties. Lessons for India are stark — economic corridors alone do not constitute strategic alliances. Without investing in institutional goodwill, India risks becoming peripheralized in Dhaka’s new power balance.

Institutional Hazards and Coordination Gaps

So far, India’s approach to Bangladesh leaned heavily on state-led financing through its $8 billion Lines of Credit. While initially useful, this dependency exhibits structural fragility during political upheavals. Bangladeshi domestic politics rarely align with the assumptions baked into these financial models. Whether looking at scholarships like Suborno Jayanti or rail recovery programs, New Delhi’s implementation pipelines demand stable political counterparts to function effectively.

This is where the Ministry of External Affairs arguably underutilizes its strategic toolkit. Despite the emphasis placed on anti-terror initiatives—regular DG-level talks between Border Guards, counter-trafficking programs—India’s ability to convert security cooperation into broader bilateral goodwill remains limited. The committee’s hesitance on addressing tools like cultural diplomacy or war memorial initiatives like Muktijoddha scholarships is telling. Connectivity agreements alone cannot withstand anti-India populism unless paired with robust pro-India narratives enabled through the state and civil society networks of Bangladesh.

Regional Implications: Migration, Counterterrorism, and Water Scarcity

Bangladesh’s 4,096-km shared border with India means that Dhaka’s cooling trajectory will directly impact counterterrorism coordination and migration control. India’s sensitive Northeast zone, where insurgencies and demographic stresses are tightly linked to cross-border flows, stands at heightened risk of instability. Moreover, the December 2026 renewal deadline for the Ganga Water Treaty looms large. The absence of formal bilateral discussions signals India’s reactive strategy on hydro-politics — an oversight with severe downstream consequences.

It is equally worrying that internal water debates dominate India’s consultations, particularly with West Bengal. While state autonomy matters, the lack of central government-led diplomatic efforts exposes inter-ministerial coordination gaps between the Ministry of Jal Shakti and the Ministry of External Affairs. Bangladesh increasingly perceives Indian posturing on water disputes as unilateral, reducing space for cooperative treaty amendments in the future.

The Anti-India Surge: Restoring Strategic Credibility

The consolidation of nationalist rhetoric within Bangladesh, coupled with external actors exploiting the vacuum left by Hasina, begs India to recalibrate. While infrastructural and defense lines remain vital, their sustainability hinges on institutional relations that transcend party affiliations. As Cambodia proved, grassroots investments in civil partnerships — cultural, educational, or sporting exchanges — often temper anti-foreign narratives better than elite-focused infrastructure agreements.

Success for India will demand creative diplomacy. Pressure points include regional bodies like SAARC and BIMSTEC, where India should aggressively advocate cooperative regionalism without cornering Dhaka. For bilateral wins, India must condition its financial largesse on pro-India governance policies while leveraging International Financial Institutions to indirectly influence Dhaka’s fiscal strategy.

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