Defence Pact Between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Pakistan-Saudi Defence Pact: Strategic Posture or Tactical Vulnerability?

On September 19, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia formalized the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, committing to consider aggression against one party as aggression against both. The timing, just days after Israel’s airstrikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar, adds both urgency and symbolism to the pact. Among its ambitions: deepening defence cooperation, strengthening deterrence, and projecting unity amidst escalating volatility in the Middle East. Yet, the broader implications extend far beyond West Asia's borders.

Why This Agreement Deviates from the Pattern

On paper, the agreement resembles existing bilateral defence accords like the Bilateral Security Cooperation Agreement of 1982. That arrangement institutionalized Pakistani troop deployments and training roles within Saudi Arabia. But what sets this pact apart is the overt messaging. Signed under the shadow of allegations that Israel’s attacks have American backing, this pact has a clear geopolitical precursor.

Historically, Saudi Arabia has preferred to shield its defence policies from overt alignment with other Islamic powers; it engaged Pakistani forces quietly in past decades, especially during incidents like the retaking of the Grand Mosque in 1979. What changes with this pact is the explicit nature of the cooperation. Unlike earlier accords, it openly embeds a collective threat response strategy into Saudi Arabia’s defence framework—a signal aimed squarely at Israel, and perhaps indirectly at the U.S.

Such moves cement Pakistan’s entry into West Asia’s security architecture not as a peripheral actor but as a central participant, creating new precedents for regional alliances outside traditional Arab blocs.

The Institutional Machinery Behind It

The operational backbone of this agreement rests on the Joint Military Cooperation Committee (JMCC), a body that emerged from Pakistani-Saudi dialogues in 1982 and expanded during the Riyadh pledges of 2025 to include joint exercises, personnel exchanges, and air force training. However, what lends this pact structural novelty is its strategic clause: the commitment that an attack on either nation would trigger mutual defence mobilization.

This provision mirrors Article 5 of NATO’s treaty but lacks comparable institutional guarantees. NATO relies heavily on collective enforcement backed by established command hierarchies and legally binding mechanisms. The Saudi-Pakistan pact, absent international observers and regulatory safeguards, rests solely on bilateral goodwill, which may not withstand geopolitical pressures.

Another limitation is funding. Saudi Arabia currently runs one of the world’s highest defence budgets—approximately $80 billion in 2024—but Pakistan’s military budget remains constrained at $11.5 billion. While Riyadh’s monetary largesse could subsidize Pakistani acquisitions, it risks drawing Islamabad into conflicts—such as Yemen—over which it has limited operational leverage.

Testing the Ground Reality

Saudi Arabia’s rationale positions this agreement as necessary to counterbalance Israel’s expanding military footprint in the Middle East. Yet much of this posturing ignores Pakistan’s grounded vulnerabilities. Despite Islamabad’s claims to strong credentials in training and advisory roles, its defence exports form just 0.44% of global arms trade, a negligible figure compared to players like Israel (2%) or South Korea (1.63%).

This underlines the dependency equation. Saudi Arabia remains a major seller of sophisticated arms, largely sourced through U.S. procurement lines. Pakistan’s ability to anchor itself independently within this framework is dubious, as recent supply bottlenecks have exposed gaps in its logistics. Even militarily, Pakistan’s repeated calls for international engagement against militant strongholds in border territories—often unheeded—expose execution deficiencies that could hinder its role in supporting Saudi Arabia’s broader deterrence goals.

The numbers reveal further irony. Between 2020 and 2024, Pakistan’s military aid dependency ratio with Gulf states grew by 19%, undermining arguments of bilateral “equal footing” this pact seeks to establish.

Uncomfortable Questions: Fragile Alliances and Overreach

While the pact affirms Islamic solidarity, one glaring omission is its silence on operational boundaries. If Saudi Arabia draws Pakistan into its long-standing Yemen quagmire under the guise of shared defence, could Islamabad face extended political blowback domestically? Pakistan’s civilian government, navigating tense IMF negotiations, may struggle to justify costly deployments to its increasingly skeptical electorate.

The defence pact also raises questions about whether its timing is politically strategic rather than militarily prudent. Having alienated the United States after claiming Washington backs Israeli strikes, Riyadh faces diplomatic isolation. Could this agreement be an attempt to project resilience where none exists?

Moreover, India’s concerns deserve more introspection. Riyadh has walked an attempt at balancing India-Pakistan relations, refusing to outright condemn Delhi’s Article 370 decision. Does Islamabad’s deepened involvement with Saudi defence dilute Riyadh’s flexibility to maintain workable relations with India?

Lessons from South Korea’s Defence Alliances

Consider South Korea’s pragmatic approach to facing military threats. While heavily reliant on external allies like the U.S., its bilateral defence agreements with non-U.S. allies prioritize transparency and critical offsets like economics. For instance, Seoul’s emerging defence partnerships with Indonesia include provisions focusing on regional trade interdependence alongside military assistance. Pakistan-Saudi terms fail to integrate economic coordination—critical if they hope to anchor broader stability.

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