China’s Military Drill Around Taiwan & India’s Strategic Interests

90 Aircraft Crossing Boundaries: China’s Justice Mission-2025 and India’s Strategic Calculations

On the first day of China’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ military drill, 90 PLA aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait centerline—an aggressive move that shattered the longstanding tacit boundary between Chinese and Taiwanese airspace. Within two days, China supplanted this aerial provocation with long-range rocket firings, landing 10 missiles in Taiwan’s contiguous zone, marking the closest proximity observed in such exercises. These maneuvers are not merely tactical; they are geopolitical signals addressed as much to Taipei as to Washington. But that signal inevitably reaches New Delhi too.

Cracking the Pattern: What Changed in 2026?

This is not China’s first demonstration of force around Taiwan concerning sovereignty claims. However, Justice Mission-2025 presents an important break from previous practices. First, the PLA’s direct violation of the Taiwan Strait centerline—a boundary both sides have cautiously respected for decades—represents an escalation with global ramifications. Second, the multi-domain focus emphasized “three-dimensional deterrence,” coordinating operations across land, sea, and air, suggesting China’s ambitions to master comprehensive blockade capabilities.

The context of this escalation is equally critical: Taiwan’s newly reinforced defense under an $11 billion pending arms deal with the U.S., involving highly advanced rocket launchers and missile systems. The drill appears tailored to counter such systems, showcasing China’s resolve to preempt external military involvement in what it deems an internal matter. The timing is significant—Taiwan’s strategic growth has collided head-on with Beijing’s aspirations for dominance, forcing regional stakeholders, including India, into recalibrations.

India’s Strategic Machinery: Positive Moves, Persistent Gaps

India’s approach has been multi-layered, spanning military exercises, diplomatic postures, and engagement through global alliances. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, especially its participation in the QUAD (India, Japan, the U.S., and Australia), is the cornerstone of its response. Justice Mission-2025 reinforces the urgency of collective deterrence mechanisms—joint naval operations through Malabar exercises, enhanced maritime domain awareness, and intelligence sharing dominate the agenda.

On maritime security, India’s naval doctrine has progressively expanded its focus toward chokepoints like the Malacca Strait. Strategic logistics agreements with Singapore and Vietnam have supplemented surveillance efforts. Yet, maintaining a robust presence in the South China Sea remains an uphill challenge, given India’s limited carrier fleet and relatively thin strategic assets in the region compared to China’s PLA-Navy.

Diplomatically, India continues to balance its official adherence to the One-China Policy against growing informal ties with Taiwan, particularly in semiconductor technology and critical supply chains. Despite quiet progress, New Delhi’s Taiwanese outreach remains risk-laden given Beijing’s ability to leverage border tensions, as seen in Ladakh. The question persists: Can India sustain ambiguity while avoiding direct costs in bilateral relations with Beijing?

Holes in the Data: Are India’s Defenses Prepared?

The Indian Navy’s planned maritime expansion—more permanent presence in disputed waters, increased joint patrols—is hindered by budgetary constraints. For 2023-24, India’s defense budget allocation for the Navy was ₹90,000 crore, a figure that pales when compared to China's $230 billion overall defense spending and the PLA-N’s ever-expanding fleet dominance.

More critically, the PLA’s display of joint force capabilities exposes gaps in India's own modernization drive. The upcoming Indian Theatre Command System—meant to facilitate tri-service integration—remains mired in inter-service disagreements over structure and leadership. Even more stark is the absence of credible missile-response programs akin to China's long-range missile systems demonstrated near Taiwan. While India has achieved milestones like Agni-V MIRVs, hypersonic development lags alarmingly.

Further, the strategic dependence on vulnerable maritime routes amplifies India’s exposure. Approximately 55% of Indian overseas trade transits the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, with energy imports reliant on stable shipping lanes. Any escalation-induced disruption will disproportionately hurt India’s fragile supply chains and the insurance costs for freight will escalate. But does India have sufficient alternatives or mitigation frameworks?

Lessons from Japan: What the Taiwan Crisis Reveals

Japan’s explicit stance—asserting that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would threaten Japan’s survival—highlights the contrasting approaches of regional responses. India, despite its increasing cooperation with Japan through mechanisms like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), lacks Tokyo’s clarity in explicitly integrating Taiwan contingency planning. While Japan pushes robust intelligence coordination and joint defense exercises under U.S. security guarantees, India’s naval and economic engagements with Taiwan have largely avoided overtly defensive postures.

Should India mirror Japan’s approach more directly, particularly regarding intelligence cooperation, or is the current model of strategic ambiguity safer given China’s border leverage? The costs of miscalculation around Taiwan could decisively shape whether India follows Tokyo’s transparency or not.

Uncomfortable Questions: Capacity, Timing, and Intent

The unmistakable risk here is whether India can match rhetoric with credible action in a Taiwan contingency. Justice Mission-2025 indirectly signals the PLA’s ability to mobilize resources seamlessly across fronts—from Taiwan to the LAC—which remains a core concern for Indian defense planners. How effectively can India respond to simultaneous escalations in Ladakh and the South China Sea?

Moreover, funding gaps loom large. Consider the Comprehensive Approach to Security System (CASS) envisioned under India’s National Security Strategy—still unfinalized despite years in debate. Without parallel defense modernization, India risks reactive posturing that undermines its assertive Indo-Pacific vision.

Finally, is India’s semiconductor outreach to Taiwan enough to weather disruption risks, and is there political appetite to drive bilateral technological partnerships further? Quiet cooperation cannot offset the supply chain risks of a Taiwan Strait conflict. India has yet to build effective domestic alternatives or multilateral contingencies to buffer such scenarios.

Exam Questions

• Prelims Question 1: Which of the following correctly describes India's position under the One-China Policy?
  
  • A. India recognizes Taiwan as an independent nation-state
  • B. India supports China's claims to Taiwan under sovereignty disputes
  • C. India refrains from officially recognizing Taiwan as independent while maintaining informal relations
  • D. India maintains equal diplomatic representation between Beijing and Taipei
• Prelims Question 2: Which of the following is a chokepoint critical to India’s Indo-Pacific maritime security?
  
  • A. Bosporus Strait
  • B. Strait of Hormuz
  • C. Sunda Strait
  • D. Malacca Strait

Mains Question: "Critically evaluate whether India’s current Indo-Pacific strategy effectively addresses the risks posed by China’s increasing military expansionism, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea."

Practice Questions for UPSC

Prelims Practice Questions

Frequently Asked Questions