Global Nuclear Order

Brief Context

The recent US President’s renewed ‘nuclear testing on an equal basis’ with Russia and China signaled a return to nuclear weapons testing, challenging decades of international restraint and global arms control dynamics.

Source Content

Syllabus: GS2/International Relation

Context

• The recent US President’s renewed ‘nuclear testing on an equal basis’ with Russia and China signaled a return to nuclear weapons testing, challenging decades of international restraint and global arms control dynamics.

Evolution of the Global Nuclear Order

• Early Cold War (1945–1962): The Global Nuclear Order has evolved from Cold War deterrence where the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept superpowers from direct conflict.
  • The dawn of the atomic age after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
  • US–USSR arms race and the emergence of deterrence theory.
  • Cuban Missile Crisis as the defining moment; prompted first arms-control efforts.
• Institutionalizing Control (1960s–1990s):
  • Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968: The cornerstone of the nuclear order — non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful uses.
  • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiations: It bans ‘any nuclear weapon test explosion’. It has never entered into force, despite 187 signatures.
    • Key non-ratifiers: U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, Iran.
    • Non-signatories: India, Pakistan, North Korea.
• Post-Cold War Optimism:
  • Declining Arsenals, Limited Proliferation: Global nuclear stockpiles fell from 65,000 weapons in the late 1970s to under 12,500 currently.
    • Only about nine states possess nuclear weapons, far fewer than the two dozen predicted in the 1960s.
  • Cooperative Threat Reduction to secure loose Soviet nuclear materials.
• US–Soviet Bilateral Treaties: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I/II, Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I/II.

Factors Undermining Global Nuclear Order

• Collapse of Arms-Control Architecture: US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (2002); Breakdown of the INF Treaty (2019); Fragility of New START, the last remaining US–Russia treaty.
  • New START, the sole remaining US – Russia arms control treaty, which will expire in February 2026 with no negotiations planned.
• Violations, Vetoes, and Erosion of Norms: North Korea’s nuclear breakout; Iran’s JCPOA instability; Lack of consensus in NPT Review Conferences; and Great-power vetoes at the UN undermining enforcement.
• China’s Rapid Arsenal Expansion: Development of MIRVs, new silos, hypersonics; China’s shift from minimum to ‘medium’ deterrence.
  • China’s arsenal is projected to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030, transforming the strategic balance.
• Russia–Ukraine War and the Nuclear Shadow: Nuclear threats used as coercion; debates on NATO’s nuclear posture; and fear of nuclear use by a conventionally inferior but nuclear-armed belligerent.
• Technology Disruption: AI-enabled early warning, autonomous systems, space-based sensors, hypersonic glide vehicles etc are increasing first-strike instability.
• Modernization Without Explosive Testing:
  • Russia: Tests of Burevestnik (nuclear-powered cruise missile) and Poseidon (nuclear-powered underwater drone).
  • China: Hypersonic glide vehicle tests since 2021.
  • United States: New B61-13 gravity bomb, W76-2 low-yield warhead, and a nuclear-armed SLCM.
• Modern Capabilities Increase Usability: Low-yield warheads, hypersonic delivery systems, and unmanned platforms increase the risk of early or mistaken nuclear use.
  • Missile defense expansions such as the proposed US ‘golden dome’ signal a new competitive cycle among nuclear states.

Cascade Effect: India, Pakistan, and Others

• If the US resumes explosive testing:
  • China and Russia will almost certainly follow.
  • India would likely resume testing to validate its thermonuclear design.
  • Pakistan would match India.
• Other threshold states may be encouraged to pursue weapons, unraveling existing non-proliferation norms.

India’s Place in the Global Nuclear Order

• India’s Responsible Stakeholder Position: No First Use (NFU)—though evolving debate; credible minimum deterrence; and strong compliance history despite being outside NPT.
• India’s Diplomatic Role: Champion of Global South perspectives on non-proliferation; calls for universal disarmament and strategic restraint; and participation in export-control regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar, etc.) but excluded from NSG.
• Challenges for India:
  • Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and unstable command structures.
  • China’s arsenal growth creates a two-front strategic problem.
  • Pressure to modernize and diversify nuclear delivery systems.

Way Forward: Possible Future Pathways

• Multipolar Nuclear Order: Return of great-power rivalry;
  • Decentralised deterrence with more nuclear dyads and triads; and 
  • Higher risk of miscalculation.
• Rebuilding Arms Control: Need for US–China–Russia trilateral frameworks.
  • Region-specific arrangements for South Asia, Middle East, and East Asia.
  • Transparency measures and crisis hotlines.
• Technological Governance: Limits on autonomous nuclear decision-making.
  • Global rules for AI-enabled command-and-control.
  • Restrictions on hypersonics and space weaponization.
• Reviving Disarmament Norms: Pressure from civil society and non-nuclear states.
  • The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as a moral instrument, even if major powers stay out.

Source: TH