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2026 Delhi Declaration

February 3, 2026 en

Brief Context

Context India hosted 22 members of the League of Arab States (AL) for the second India-Arab Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 years after the first iteration in Bahrain. About This meeting occurred amid escalating tensions between Iran and the US, a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and UAE, and the US led Board of Peace attempting a new approach to resolving the Israel-Palestine question. In a joint statement called the Delhi Declaration, India and the Arab League clarified their positions on a num

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Syllabus: GS2/IR

Context

  • India hosted 22 members of the League of Arab States (AL) for the second India-Arab Foreign Ministers Meeting, 10 years after the first iteration in Bahrain.

About

  • This meeting occurred amid escalating tensions between Iran and the US, a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and UAE, and the US led Board of Peace attempting a new approach to resolving the Israel-Palestine question.
  • In a joint statement called the Delhi Declaration, India and the Arab League clarified their positions on a number of issues, apart from commitments to enhance cooperation.
  • 3rd India-Arab Ministerial Meeting of the Forum is to be held in 2028 in one of the Arab States.

India–Arab League Engagement

  • The Arab League, officially known as the League of Arab States was established in Cairo in 1945 initially with seven members.
    • Currently it has 22 member states.
  • The India–Arab Foreign Ministers’ Meeting is the highest institutional mechanism guiding India’s engagement with the Arab League.
  • The dialogue process was institutionalised in 2002 through a Memorandum of Understanding between India and the League of Arab States to establish a regular framework for consultation.
  • In 2008, the relationship was further strengthened through a Memorandum of Cooperation, leading to the establishment of the Arab–India Cooperation Forum (AICF).
    • The cooperation framework was revised in 2013 to streamline its structure and improve effectiveness.
  • India holds observer status in the Arab League, which represents countries across West Asia and North Africa.

Highlights of the Delhi Declaration

  • The Delhi Declaration reiterates support for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Sudan, Libya and Somalia, rejecting external interference indirectly reflecting fractures within the Arab world.
  • Sudan: UAE is accused of backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has fought the Sudanese state since 2023 and formed a parallel government in 2025; the Declaration aligns with Sudan and condemns civilian atrocities.
  • Somalia: Israel alone recognises Somaliland; UAE’s 2025 recognition of Somaliland passports diverges from Arab League consensus. India firmly rejected recognition and backed Somalia’s territorial integrity.
  • Yemen: India and the Arab League explicitly condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, marking a shift from India’s earlier indirect language post-2023.
    • Support for Yemen’s unity aligns with Saudi actions against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council.

India’s Policy Focus in West Asia

  • Primacy of Sovereignty and International Legitimacy: India’s emphasis on sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity in Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen aligns with its long-standing position against secessionism and parallel governments.
    • This reinforces India’s own concerns regarding territorial integrity and rejection of externally supported non-state actors.
    • Backing internationally recognised governments allows India to stay on the right side of international law without being drawn into military blocs.
  • Quiet Signalling Towards the Saudi-Led Order: While avoiding overt bloc politics, the Declaration subtly converges with Saudi Arabia’s positions on Yemen’s unity, Reconciliation-centric approaches in Libya, Support for the Sudanese state against RSF militias.
    • This reflects India’s calculation that Saudi Arabia remains systemically more important for Energy security, Indian diaspora welfare, and stability of the Gulf economic ecosystem.
  • Managing, Not Confronting, the UAE: Despite divergences (Sudan, Libya, Somaliland), India avoids naming or criticising the UAE directly.
    • The UAE is India’s key economic and logistics partner (CEPA, I2U2, IMEC).
    • India’s approach suggests issue-based disagreement without strategic rupture, preserving functional cooperation.
  • The declaration made no reference to US military presence around Iran. This silence allows India to maintain ties with Iran, Arab states and the US simultaneously.
  • Strategic Autonomy in a Fragmenting West Asia: India’s positions collectively demonstrate:
    • Autonomy from US-Israeli framing, despite cooperation with both.
    • Avoidance of ideological entanglement in Arab power rivalries.
    • Preference for status-quo stability over revolutionary or militia-driven change.

Conclusion

  • The Delhi Declaration shows India acting as a status-quo power in West Asia, prioritising sovereignty, stability and maritime security, while carefully balancing rival regional camps without overt alignment.

Source: IE